Super-alarms with diagnosis proficiency used as an additional layer of protection applied to an oil transport system by Vásquez, John W. et al.
entropy
Article
Super-Alarms with Diagnosis Proficiency Used as an Additional
Layer of Protection Applied to an Oil Transport System





Sotomayor-Moriano, J.; Ospino, A.
Super-Alarms with Diagnosis
Proficiency Used as an Additional
Layer of Protection Applied to an Oil
Transport System. Entropy 2021, 23,
139. https://doi.org/10.3390/
e23020139
Received: 18 September 2020
Accepted: 12 October 2020
Published: 23 January 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
1 Research Group GPS, Universidad de Investigación y Desarrollo—UDI, Bucaramanga 680004, Colombia
2 Departamento de Ingeniería, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú—PUCP, Avenida Universitaria 1801,
San Miguel, Lima 15088, Peru; gustavo.perez@pucp.pe (G.P.-Z.); jsotom@pucp.edu.pe (J.S.-M.)
3 Research Group GIOPEN, Universidad de la Costa—CUC, Barranquilla 080014, Colombia;
aospino8@cuc.edu.co
* Correspondence: jvasquez@udi.edu.co
Abstract: In automated plants, particularly in the petrochemical, energy, and chemical industries,
the combined management of all of the incidents that can produce a catastrophic accident is required.
In order to do this, an alarm management methodology can be formulated as a discrete event
sequence recognition problem, in which time patterns are used to identify the safe condition of the
process, especially in the start-up and shutdown stages. In this paper, a new layer of protection
(a Super-Alarm), based on the diagnostic stage to industrial processes is presented. The alarms
and actions of the standard operating procedures are considered to be discrete events involved in
sequences; the diagnostic stage corresponds to the recognition of the situation when these sequences
occur. This provides operators with pertinent information about the normal or abnormal situations
induced by the flow of the alarms. Chronicles Based Alarm Management (CBAM) is the methodology
used in this document to build the chronicles that will permit us to generate the Super-Alarms;
in addition, a case study of the petrochemical sector using CBAM is presented in order to build one
chronicle that represents the scenario of an abnormal start-up of an oil transport system. Finally,
the scenario’s validation for this case is performed, showing the way in which, a Super-Alarm
is generated.
Keywords: alarm management; protection layers; safe-process; Super-Alarm; diagnosis
1. Introduction
Today, the expanding complexity of control systems is due to the increasing automa-
tion of industrial production processes. The use of digital information-based technologies
in these systems suggests an increase in the amount of data that must be monitored and pro-
cessed, including better communication ability between the agents of the process [1]. The
automatic reconfiguration of embedded control systems is a usual requirement for highly
automated systems, and the applications of fault diagnosis are difficult to implement [2,3];
consequently, the ultimate goal for a supervision and control system is to optimize the
availability, reliability, and safety of production processes [4]. With regards to safety, the
integrated management of the critical factors in the process ensures an optimum reliability
level in the industrial plants [5,6]. Factors such as the control of the process variables,
procedures, and steps followed in the transitional stages are intended to keep the plants
within the operating established limits [7,8]. On the starting or shutdown procedures, the
quantity of signals increases, so the plant’s safety needs to involve the integrated manage-
ment of those factors when analyzing the causes of the accidents. In other words, these
factors must be managed together, and not separately, because if any of them is left outside,
unattended or decreased, the security would be threatened [9,10]. When one industrial
process changes its state, for example, its start-up and shutdown stages, the alarm flood
spreads, and it causes severe situations in which the operator cannot react correctly. Besides
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this, it is commonly reported that 70% of plant conflicts happen at the start-up/shutdown
stages [11]. Due to this alarm flood, dynamic alarm management is needed. Nowadays,
many fault detection and diagnosis methods for multimode processes have been proposed;
however, these techniques cannot register fundamental faults in the basic alarm system [12].
Consequently, the operators need a tool that helps them to recognize the plant’s situation,
especially in the transitional stages such as start-up and shutdown.
Safety conditions and the advancing performance in the monitoring, control, and
management of complex systems have stimulated notable interest and efforts dedicated
to the advancement of fault detection and isolation techniques. This raises the need not
only for a diagnosis system that helps to maintain the safety increasing the availability of
the installation, but also for new alarm management methodologies [13]. Industrial plant
safety involves the integrated management of all of the factors that may cause accidents.
As such, alarm management is one aspect of great interest in safety planning for different
plants. Any additional support in the protection of industrial processes will be well
received in the process of safeprocess community. This article is divided into four sections.
Section 1 presents the introduction. Section 2 describes the research method, including the
traditional layers of protection in an industrial process and the Super-Alarm as a new layer
of protection; furthermore, the Chronicle Based Alarm Management methodology is also
presented in this section. Section 3 presents a case study with the results analysis. Section 4
corresponds to the conclusions.
2. Research Method
This section presents a research method which includes the proposal of a new pro-
tection layer, called a Super-Alarm, followed by the description of the Chronicle Based
Alarm Management methodology used to generate Super-Alarms, which will help in the
diagnosis of the industrial processes, especially in the startup and shutdown stages.
2.1. Layers of Protection and the Super-Alarm Layer
The operation of many industrial processes, especially in the chemical, mineral, en-
ergy and petrochemical sectors, involves inherent risks due to the presence of dangerous
materials like gases and chemicals, which in some conditions can cause emergencies. In
these types of industrial processes, safety is supplied by layers of protection [14], which
begin with a safe design (the Process design level) and an effective process control (the
Process Control level), followed by the manual (the Operator interventions level) and
automatic (the Safety Instrumented System level) prevention layers, and concluding with
layers to mitigate the consequences of a critical event (the Active protection level, Passive
protection level, Plant emergency response level, and Community emergency response
level), as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Safety layers of protection. 
Diagnosis in industrial processes corresponds to the procedures, activities, and tools 
that help operators to recognize the real plant situation, especially at transitional stages in 
which the risk of accidents increases. Figure 2 presents the process safety relationships, in 
which (at the left of the figure) the protection layers (Loop, Alarm, and Trip) are related 
to all of the elements of the supervision scheme. With regard to the components of the 
supervision scheme, the first level includes the instrumentation and actuators of the sys-
tem, including the Safety Instrumented System (SIS). The next level contains the acquisi-
tion and control equipment, followed by the supervision stage, in which the tools of diag-
nosis are implemented. Now, these tools of diagnosis could be a new protection layer in 
the process if it gives relevant information to the operators, especially when an alarms 
flood occurs. The goal of supervision and control tools is to maintain the process variables 
between its limits of operation. 
 
Figure 2. Process safety relationships. 
In order to determine the events and signals of a procedure, it is necessary to analyze 
and consider the initial conditions of the process, and to identify possible failure modes. 
Hence, a complex system requires a division into subsystems to allow a reliable analysis. 
The goal of the technology used is to maintain the process variables on their limits of op-
eration. One additional layer of protection could reduce the accident probability, helping 
the operators to take better decisions when alarm floods happen. It has been demonstrated 
that advanced diagnostic systems for industrial processes, together with the interventions 
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Diagnosis in industrial processes corresponds to the procedures, activities, and tools
that help operators to recognize the real plant situation, especially at transitional stages in
which the risk of accidents increases. Figure 2 presents the process safety relationships, in
which (at the left of the figure) the protection layers (Loop, Alarm, and Trip) are related
to all of the elements of the supervision scheme. With regard to the components of the
supervision scheme, the first level includes the instrumentation and actuators of the system,
including the Safety Instrumented System (SIS). The next level contains the acquisition and
control equipment, followed by the supervision stage, in which the tools of diagnosis are
implemented. Now, these tools of diagnosis could be a new protection layer in the process
if it gives relevant information to the operators, especially when an alarms flood occurs.
The goal of supervision and control tools is to maintain the process variables between its
limits of operation.
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In order to determine the events and signals of a procedure, it is necessary to analyze
and consider the initial co itions of the process, and to ide tify possible f ilure modes.
Hence, a complex system requires a division into subsystems to allow a reliable analysis.
The goal of the technology used is to maintain the process variables on their limits of
operation. One additional layer of protection could reduce the accident probability, helping
the operators to take better decisions when alarm floods happen. It has been demonstrated
that advanced diagnostic systems for industrial processes, together with the interventions
of the op ators, may constitute an additional protective af ty layer [15]. However,
these new elements seem to have never been included as a layer of protection because
diagnostic systems for industrial processes are not yet extensive in practical tools [16].
In terms of process safety, the principal characteristics of a good protective barrier are
specificity, independence, reliability, and audit. ‘Specificity’ refers to a barrier that is capable
of detecting and preventing or mitigating the consequences of a potentially dangerous
specific event (e.g., explosion). ‘Independence’ refers to a barrier which is independent of
all of the other layers which are associated with the potentially dangerous event, when there
is no potential for common cause failures. Furthermore, the protection layer is independent
of the initiating event. ‘Reliability’ refers to the protection provided by the barrier, which
reduces the risk identified for a specific and known quantity, which is then determined by
its probability of failure. ‘Auditing’ refers to the fact that a barrier must be designed to
allow inspections, and the periodic and regular testing of the protection function [17,18].
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A new protection barrier called a Super-Alarm has been proposed in [19,20], situated
between the layer Alarm and the layer Trip (SIS); see Figure 3. This new barrier comes
from a diagnosis process, and it is specific because it is capable of detecting and preventing
one specific (particular) dangerous situation, e.g., the wrong operative action in the start-
up procedure, or a failure in one valve. This new barrier is independent because its
functionality does not depend on the other elements: if some of the signals involved in the
diagnosis tool fail, this new tool could detect it. The reliability of this barrier is determined
by the reduction of the large number of alarms avoided by the operators. Finally, this
new protection layer can be audited, because the diagnosis tools permit its revision from a
methodology that includes simulations of scenarios checking the response. The concept
of a Super-Alarm corresponds to a new alert to the operators resulting from a diagnosis
procedure representing a superior alarm. Consequently, in automatic control systems, the
supervision functions serve to indicate undesirable or unpermitted process states, and
takes appropriate actions that maintain performance and avoid damage or harm states.
A system is said to be diagnosable if whatever the behavior of the system, it will be able
to determine, without ambiguity, a unique diagnosis. When a super-alarm is generated,
the supervision and control system can provoke automatic control actions in addition to
the alerts to the operators. The diagnosability of a system is generally computed from
its model [21]; in applications using a model-based diagnosis, such a model is already
present and does not need to be built from scratch. The methodology used to generate
super-alarms in this paper is supported by an event-based diagnosis process in which,
from a flow of discrete events, normal and abnormal situations can be detected. The fault
diagnosis in general consists in the following three important aspects: ‘fault detection’
consists in discovering the existence of faults in the most useful units in the process; ‘fault
isolation’ refers to the localization (classification) of the different faults; ‘fault analysis
or identification’ consists in determining the type, degree and origin of the fault [22]. In
this paper, a fault is considered to be the consequence of a sequence of discrete events
that represent this faulty scenario; a fault is not considered to be a single fault event. In
conclusion, a super-alarm corresponds to a new element resulting from a diagnosis process
in which risk and hazard analysis are required. Designing and constructing Super-Alarms
in a supervisory system requires a methodology that gives us relevant information about
the process according to the events and procedural actions that have occurred.




Figure 3. New layer of protection called a Super-Alarm. 
2.2. Chronicle Based Alarm Management Methodology 
Definition 1. An event e is defined as a pair e = (𝜎𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖), in which 𝜎𝑖 ∈ E is an event type, and 𝑡𝑖 
is a variable of an integer type called the event date. E correspond to the set of the totally event 
types of the system. Several events can have the same type of event, but do not necessarily have the 
same date; for instance e1 = (a, 3) and e2 = (a, 6) are two events that carry the same type of event (a). 
A flow of activity generated by a system is represented by a temporal sequence. In 
these temporal sequences, the time is represented by a discrete set of time points which is 
totally ordered, and whose granularity is sufficiently thin compared to the observed dy-
namics; given the precision permitted by the means of observation, we can assume that 
there is no inaccuracy. In the following, we may refer to an event type as an event for 
brevity. A temporal sequence (or a sequence, for short) consists of several events which 
take place in an orderly manner, which leads us to the following definition: 
Definition 2. A sequence on E is denoted as an ordered set of events S = (𝜎𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖  )𝑗 with j ∈ Nl, in 
which l is the size of the temporal sequence S, and Nl is a finite set of linearly ordered instants of 
cardinality l. Furthermore, l =|S| is the size of the temporal sequence, i.e., the number of event type 
occurrences in S. An example of a sequence representing an activity stream may be given by the 
sequence 𝑆1 = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, 𝑒4, 𝑒5, 𝑒6} = {(𝑎, 2), (𝑏, 4), (𝑐, 5), (𝑎, 8), (𝑏, 9), (𝑎, 10)} with l1 = 6. 
Definition 3. A chronicle is defined as a triplet C = 〈ξ,Τ,G〉 [23], such that: ξ ⊆ E, in which ξ is 
called the typology of the chronicle, and Τ is the set of temporal constraints of the chronicle. G = 
(Ψ,A) is a directed graph in which: 
• Ψ is a set of indexed event types, i.e., a finite indexed family defined by ψ: H → E, in 
which H ⊏ N.  
• A is a set of edges between the indexed event types; there is an edge (𝜎1(ℎ1), 𝜎2(ℎ2)) ∈ 
A if and only if there is a time constraint between 𝜎1(ℎ1), and 𝜎2(ℎ2). 
Definition 4. The chronicle instance: a chronicle C = 〈 ξ,Τ,G 〉 is recognized in a temporal sequence 
S of event types ξ´, such that ξ ⊆ ξ´, when all temporal constraints Τ are satisfied. Then, Cinst = 〈 
ξ´, Τv 〉 in which Τv is a valuation of Τ. If the sequence S has finished, and at least one event that 
occurs violates some temporal constraint, this chronicle is not recognized. Figure 4 illustrates the 
above definition: the chronicle on the left is recognized in the first and second sequence. Neverthe-
less, it is not recognized in the third sequence, because the only set of constraints relating a,b,c, and 
d in this sequence (Sequence3) is: Τv = {a[5,5]b; a[3,3]c; c[2,2]b; b[2,2]d}, and Τv is not a valuation 
of T = {a[3,4]b; a[1,2]c; c[1,2]b; b[1,2]d}.  
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2.2. Chronicle Based Alarm Management Methodology
Definition 1. An event e is defined as a pair e = (σi, ti), in which σi ∈ E is an event type, and ti is
a variable of an integer type called the event date. E correspond to the set of the totally event types of
the system. Several events can have the same type of event, but do not necessarily have the same
date; for instance e1 = (a, 3) and e2 = (a, 6) are two events that carry the same type of event (a).
A flow of activity generated by a system is represented by a temporal sequence. In
these temporal sequences, the time is represented by a discrete set of time points which
is totally ordered, and whose granularity is sufficiently thin compared to the observed
dynamics; given the precision permitted by the means of observation, we can assume that
there is no inaccuracy. In the following, we may refer to an event type as an event for
brevity. A temporal sequence (or a sequence, for short) consists of several events which
take place in an orderly manner, which leads us to the following definition:
Definition 2. A sequence on E is denoted as an ordered set of events S = (σi, ti)j with j ∈ Nl, in
which l is the size of the temporal sequence S, and Nl is a finite set of linearly ordered instants of
cardinality l. Furthermore, l = |S| is the size of the temporal sequence, i.e., the number of event
type occurrences in S. An example of a sequence representing an activity stream may be given by
the sequence S1 = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6} = {(a, 2), (b, 4), (c, 5), (a, 8), (b, 9), (a, 10)} with l1 = 6.
Definition 3. A chronicle is defined as a triplet C = 〈ξ,T,G〉 [23], such that: ξ ⊆ E, in which
ξ is called the typology of the chronicle, and T is the set of temporal constraints of the chronicle.
G = (Ψ,A) is a directed graph in which:
• Ψ is a set of indexed event types, i.e., a finite indexed family defined by ψ: H→ E, in
which H < N.
• A is a set of edges between the indexed event types; there is an edge (σ1(h1), σ2(h2)) ∈ A
if and only if there is a time constraint between σ1(h1), and σ2(h2).
Definition 4. The chronicle instance: a chronicle C = 〈 ξ,T,G 〉 is recognized in a temporal
sequence S of event types ξ´, such that ξ ⊆ ξ´, when all temporal constraints T are satisfied. Then,
Cinst = 〈 ξ´, Tv 〉 in which Tv is a valuation of T. If the sequence S has finished, and at least one
event that occurs violates some temporal constraint, this chronicle is not recognized. Figure 4
illustrates the above definition: the chronicle on the left is recognized in the first and second sequence.
Nevertheless, it is not recognized in the third sequence, because the only set of constraints relating
a,b,c, and d in this sequence (Sequence3) is: Tv = {a[5,5]b; a[3,3]c; c[2,2]b; b[2,2]d}, and Tv is not a
valuation of T = {a[3,4]b; a[1,2]c; c[1,2]b; b[1,2]d}.




Figure 4. Chronicle instance. 
Definition 5. The temporal restriction: a temporal restriction for a pair of event types (𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗) is a 
given time constraint between their event dates 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝜎𝑖[𝑡
−, 𝑡+]𝜎𝑗. 
The principle of Chronicle Based Alarm Management (CBAM) is to consider several 
process situations (normal or abnormal) during the start-up and shutdown stages, and to 
model each one of these situations through a learned chronicle. For this, given the situa-
tion to be modeled, the algorithm HCDAM (Heuristic Chronicle Discovery Algorithm 
Modified) is fed by a set of event sequences that are structured from simulations and the 
expert knowledge, giving us the respective chronicle of each situation [24]. Finally, when 
these chronicles are recognized, a Super-Alarm can be generated, giving relevant infor-
mation to the operator’s, and we can assume that it as a new layer of protection from 
which actions can reduce the accident occurrences because, in many situations of alarm 
flood, hazardous scenarios happen. The global objective of CBAM is to generate a chron-
icle database on which a diagnosis process based on chronicle recognition is then per-
formed. This new methodology relies then on three main steps, as shown below: 
STEP 1: Event type identification. The aim of this step is to determine the event types 
that define the chronicles. For this step, information from the standard operating proce-
dures and from the evolution of the continuous variables is exploited. 
STEP 2: Event sequence generation. From the expertise and an event abstraction pro-
cedure, this step determines the date of occurrence of each event type for the construction 
of the representative event sequences used by a learning algorithm. A representative 
event sequence is the set of event types with their dates of occurrence that can be associ-
ated with a specific scenario of the process. The representative event sequences are then 
verified using the hybrid modeling of the system and the hybrid causal graphs. 
STEP 3: Chronicle database construction. For each scenario, the representative event 
sequences and temporal restrictions are given by experts, and these elements are taken to 
learn chronicles. In order to learn chronicles, this step uses the extended version of the 
Heuristic Chronicle Discovery Algorithm (HCDAM), which is described in [10] and [22]. 
The set of chronicles learned for each scenario and each process element constitutes the 
chronicle database. A complex process Pr is composed of different units or areas Pr = {Ar1, 
Ar2, Ar3, ……. Arn} in which each area has φ operational modes (e.g start-up, shutdown, 
slow march, etc.) noted Oi, i = 1,2,3...φ. The process behavior in each operating mode can 
be either normal or faulty. The set of failure labels is defined as Δf = {f1, f2, f3,….fr}, and the 
complete set of possible labels is 𝛥 = 𝑁⋃𝛥𝑓, in which N means normal. In order to moni-
tor the process and to recognize the different situations (normal or faulty) of the opera-
tional modes, it is proposed to build a chronicle base for each area. For a given area, a 
learned chronicle 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑚 is associated with each couple (𝑂𝑖 , 𝐿𝑗) in which 𝐿𝑗 ∈ 𝛥. Equation (1) 
































Figure 4. Chronicle instance.
Definition 5. The temporal restriction: a temporal restriction for a pair of event types (σi, σj) is a
given time constraint between their event dates TRij = σi[t−, t+]σj.
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The principle of Chronicle Based Alarm Management (CBAM) is to consider several
process situations (normal or abnormal) during the start-up and shutdown stages, and
to model each one of these situations through a learned chronicle. For this, given the
situation to be modeled, the algorithm HCDAM (Heuristic Chronicle Discovery Algorithm
Modified) is fed by a set of event sequences that are structured from simulations and
the expert knowledge, giving us the respective chronicle of each situation [24]. Finally,
when these chronicles are recognized, a Super-Alarm can be generated, giving relevant
information to the operator’s, and we can assume that it as a new layer of protection from
which actions can reduce the accident occurrences because, in many situations of alarm
flood, hazardous scenarios happen. The global objective of CBAM is to generate a chronicle
database on which a diagnosis process based on chronicle recognition is then performed.
This new methodology relies then on three main steps, as shown below:
STEP 1: Event type identification. The aim of this step is to determine the event
types that define the chronicles. For this step, information from the standard operating
procedures and from the evolution of the continuous variables is exploited.
STEP 2: Event sequence generation. From the expertise and an event abstraction pro-
cedure, this step determines the date of occurrence of each event type for the construction
of the representative event sequences used by a learning algorithm. A representative event
sequence is the set of event types with their dates of occurrence that can be associated with
a specific scenario of the process. The representative event sequences are then verified
using the hybrid modeling of the system and the hybrid causal graphs.
STEP 3: Chronicle database construction. For each scenario, the representative event
sequences and temporal restrictions are given by experts, and these elements are taken
to learn chronicles. In order to learn chronicles, this step uses the extended version of
the Heuristic Chronicle Discovery Algorithm (HCDAM), which is described in [10,22].
The set of chronicles learned for each scenario and each process element constitutes
the chronicle database. A complex process Pr is composed of different units or areas
Pr = {Ar1, Ar2, Ar3, . . . . . . . Arn} in which each area has ϕ operational modes (e.g start-
up, shutdown, slow march, etc.) noted Oi, i = 1,2,3...ϕ. The process behavior in each
operating mode can be either normal or faulty. The set of failure labels is defined as
∆f = {f 1, f 2, f 3, . . . . f r}, and the complete set of possible labels is ∆ = N
⋃
∆ f , in which N
means normal. In order to monitor the process and to recognize the different situations
(normal or faulty) of the operational modes, it is proposed to build a chronicle base for
each area. For a given area, a learned chronicle Cmij is associated with each couple (Oi, Lj)
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When Lj = N, the chronicle is a model of the normal behavior of the considered
system, otherwise (Lj = f j) the chronicle is a model of the behavior of the system under
the occurrence of the fault f j. This methodology (CBAM) was proposed to address the
problem of alarm management by developing reliable tools that support the analysis
of event streams, in order to recognize activities that can generate normal or abnormal
situations in complex flows [24,25]. The challenge is then to fit the formal recognition
of behaviors into the context of Complex Event Processing. The dynamics of a process
can be represented by an approach that depicts the behavior of the process using the
events that occur during the process evolution. In this context, the chronicle approach [26]
has been applied in many applications of situation recognition, often with a diagnosis
objective. Chronicles are temporal patterns supported by a set of observable events and
a set of temporal constraints between pairs of events [27]. One of the main difficulties of
situation recognition based on chronicles is to obtain automatically a base of chronicles that
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represents each situation of interest. The proposal is then to use a chronicle recognition
approach to analyze the behavior of the process, and to use learning techniques for the
chronicles’ design. Diagnosis by situation recognition (chronicle-based diagnosis) in the
startup and shutdown stages of mining/mineral/metal/chemical/petrochemical processes
as a support for human operators is the principal goal of this new methodology, and it is
resumed in the fact that super alarms can be generated according to the scenarios detected
by the chronicles. In this paper, the hybrid system is represented by an extended transition
system, whose discrete states represent the different modes of operation for which the
continuous dynamics are characterized by a qualitative domain [28]. Formally, a hybrid
causal system is defined as a tuple Γ = 〈V,D,Tr,E,CSD,Init,COMP, DCM〉, where:
• V = {υi} is a set of continuous process variables which are functions of time.
• D is a set of discrete variables. D = Q⋃K⋃VQ, where:
# Q is a set of states qi of the transition system, which represents the system’s
operation modes.
# The set of auxiliary discrete variables K = {Ki}, I = 1,2,3, . . . .nc represents the
system configuration in each mode qi, in which Ki indicates the discrete state
of the active components.
# VQ is a set of qualitative variables whose values are obtained from the behavior
of each continuous variable υi.
• E = Σ ⋃ Σc is a finite set of observables (Σo) and unobservable (Σuo) event types, in
which Σ is the set of event type associated to the procedural actions, for example, in
the start-up or shutdown stages, and Σc is the set of event types associated to the
behavior of the continuous process variables.
• Tr:Q × Σ→ Q is the transition function. The transition from mode qi to mode qj with
associated event σ is noted (qi,σ,qj).
• CSD ⊇ ∪iCSDi is the Causal System Description or the causal model used to represent
the constraints underlying the continuous dynamics of the hybrid system.
Every CSDi associated to a mode qi, is given by a graph Gc = V∪K, I, in which I is




∈ I from υi ∈ V to υj ∈ V if the
variable υi influences variable υj. A dynamic control model DCMIk is associated to every
influence Ik ∈ I. Figure 5 presents the Dynamic Control Model where one procedural
action σi is related as an observable event that connects the industrial controller (PID)
with the model of the active component (Comp. model) which corresponds to a transfer
function of first order with delay. The event that closes the control loop σj is assumed to be
an unobservable event.




Figure 5. Dynamic Control Model (DCM). 
3. Results 
Oil transport is one important action in the petrochemical sector. The aim is to help 
the operator to recognize dangerous conditions during the start-up stage of an Oil 
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the level L of the tank, the pressure Po in the pump, and the outlet flow Qo(V2) in valve
V2. For the startup stage in this process, the initial conditions are that the tank (TK) is
empty, the valves V1 and V2 are closed, and the pump Pu is off. In this situation, the alarms
for the low levels in all of the continuous variables (L, Po and Qo(V2)) are active. For the
shutdown stage in this process, the initial conditions could be different for each one of the
others, depending on the situation in which the system is. For example, one condition is
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Figure 6. Oil Transport System unit.
This Oil Transport System is composed of the following elements: sensors, passive
components, and active components. The sensors are the level sensor (LT), the pressure
sensor (PT), the inflow sensor (FT1) and the outflow sensor (FT2). The passive component
is the tank (TK); in addition, the active components are two normally closed valves (V1 and
V2), and one pump (Pu). Since there are three ctive components, the Oil Transport System
obviously involves hybrid behavior. Modeling the behavior of this hybrid system involves
a set of continuous variables and a set of discrete variables. The continuous variables are
the level L, pressure Po, and outflow Qo(V2), V = {L,Po,Qo(V2)}. The discrete variables
are r lated to the operational actions of the process and the changes in the continuous
variables, then the event types for this process are identified in the next sub-section.
3.1. Applying CBAM
In this subsection, the three steps of the Chronicle Based Alarm Management method-
ology are described.
3.1.1. STEP 1: Event Type Identification
In the Oil Transport System of the case of this study, the set of event types Σ that
represent the procedure actions is
Σ = {V1, V2, PuO, v1, v2, PuF, M2A} (2)
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where V1 (resp. V2) is for the action that switches the valve V1 (resp. V2) from closed
to opened. On the other hand, v1 (v2) is the action that switches the valve V1 (resp. V2)
from opened to closed, and PuO (resp. PuF) is for the action that turns on (resp. off) the
pump. The event M2A corresponds to the transition from ‘manual’ to ‘automatic’ operation,
closing the control loops. In the reminder of this discussion, we assume that this event
is the unique unobservable event of the system, i.e., M2A ∈ Σuo. The underlying DES
(Discrete event system) of the Oil Transport System represents the sequence of observable
procedure actions for a start-up stage (indicated by the red or green arrows in Figure 7,
corresponding to the evolution of the operation modes (i.e., q0, q1, q4, q5, q7); for instance,
in the mode of operation, q1 can be determined when the valve V1 is opened; therefore, the
continuous variable QiTK influences the variable L, and the supervision system will wait
for the event which indicates that after of a specific period of time, the level of water into
the tank TK has passed its low limit. Each operation mode qi is associated with a causal
system description to identify the influences between the variables L, Po and Qo(V2). These
influences allow the determination of the occurrence of the events Σc.
Σc =
{
L(L), l(L), H(L), h(L), L(Po), l(Po), H(Po), h(Po), L(Qo(V2)), l(Qo(V2)), H(Qo(V2)), h(Qo(V2))
}
(3)
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L(L) indicates that the process variable L has passed its low level from down to up,
and l(L) indicates that the process variable L has passed its low level from up to down. The
same is true for the other variables Po and Qo(V2).
3.1.2. STEP 2: Event Sequence Generation
From simulations, the behavior of the variables is obtained, and the learning event
sequences are generated according to the evolution of the system in each scenario. In this
manuscript, the scenario of an abnormal start-up is analyzed. This abnormal situation is
related to a failure in the valve V2. In this scenario, the sequences of the event types are
similar to the event sequences of a normal start-up, until it is detected that the outlet flow
in the system does not increase. When the level of oil in the tank TK arrived to its high
limit, the ordered sequence of the event types that has occurred must be V1, L(L), H(L),
PuO, V2 or V1, L(L), H(L), V2, PuO. In scenario 2a (V1, L(L), H(L), PuO, V2), the event type
L(Po) occurs after V2. In scenario 2b (V1, L(L), H(L), V2, PuO), the event type L(Po) occurs
after PuO. The event type H(Po) occurs after L(Po). Therefore, the ordered sequences of
event types must be: V1, L(L), H(L), PuO, V2, L(Po), H(Po) or V1, L(L), H(L), V2, PuO,
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L(Po), H(Po). For this scenario, we chose the representative event sequences (S1, S2 and S3)
that show the extreme behaviors of all of the possible sequence orders of the event types.
S1 = 〈(V1,1); (L(L),21); (H(L),48); (PuO,50); (V2,51); (L(Po),60); (H(Po),75)〉
S2 = 〈(V1,1); (L(L),25); (H(L),55); (V2,56); (PuO,57); (L((Po),63); (H(Po),78)〉
S3 = 〈(V1,1); (L(L),28); (H(L),60); (PuO,61); (V2,62); (L(Po),71); (H(Po),85)〉
The simulation of this abnormal start-up is presented in Figure 8, where the evolution
of the variables L and Po is represented. The variable Qo(V2) does not appear, because the
valve V2 has failed. The values of the variables are specified as follows:
• For the variable of the level (L), the value of 0 corresponds to 0 m; each increase of
2 (vertical axis) corresponds to 2 m.
• For the variable of the pressure (Po), the value of 0 corresponds to 0 PSI; each increase
of 2 (vertical axis) corresponds to 20 psi.
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2)) as HQ; h(Qo(V 2)) as hQ. For the scenario of an abnormal start-up, the following tem-
poral restrictions are used in the extended version of the HCDAM (Heuristic Chronicle 
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3.1.3. STEP 3: Chronicle Database Construction
This chronicle database is to be submitted to a chronicle recognition system that
identifies in an observable flow of events, all of the possible matching with the set of
chronicles. Chronicles from which the situation (normal or faulty) can be assessed by
generating a Super-Alarm. The chronicle C111 from the set of chronicles of the Oil Transport
System is presented, i.e., of the area Ar1 of the whole syst m. Therefore, th chro icle C111
is associated with a failure behavior of type f 1 during a start-up stage. In the figures of
the chronicles, the events are specified as follows: L(L) as LL; l(L) as lL; H(L) as HL; h(L)
as hL; L(Po) as LP; L(Po) as lP; H(Po) as HP; h(Po) as hP; L(Qo(V 2)) as LQ; l(Qo(V 2)) as
lQ; H(Qo(V 2)) as HQ; h(Qo(V 2)) as hQ. For the scenario of an abnormal sta t-up, the
following temporal restrictions are used in the extended version of the HCDAM (Heuristic
Chronicle Discovery Algorithm) [23]. The notation TRPuO,V2 = PuO[−2,2]V2 corresponds
to a temporal restriction which indicates that the valve V2 can be opened (V2) two time
units bef e t at th pump Pu is turned on (PuO) or, on the contrary, that PuO occurs
two time units before that of V2. On the other hand, the temporal restriction noted as
TRHL,PuO = HL[1,4]PuO, expresses that the pump Pu is turned on (PuO) between one and
four time units after that the high limit level into the tank happens (HL). The chronicle C111
hat resulted using the algorithm HCDAM is presented in Figure 9. The lea ning event
sequences used are the S1, S2 and S3 which were generated before (STEP 2).
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3.2. Validation
This section presents the evaluation of the chronicle C111, which represents
the temporal pattern for an abnormal start-up in the Oil Transport System. One
sequence of evaluation that belongs to this abnormal scenario is presented below:
Seval = 〈(V1,1);(LL,26);(HL,58);(PuO,60);(V2,62);(LP,70);(HP,85)〉, which is different to the
learning event sequences, and it expresses an abnormal condition of start-up. Figures 10–16
present the recognition process of the chronicle and the generation of one Super-Alarm.
In Figure 10, the first occurrence is (V1, 1); the next occurrence must be of the event LL
between 20 and 28 time-units. Now, in Figure 11, the activation of LL at 26 is presented,
indicating also that the next occurrence must be HL. The following events occur (PuO, V2,
LP and HP) un il the chronicle is ecognized and the sup r alarm is g n rated. Therefore,
this new element (the Super-Alarm) correspo ds to one superior alarm that gives the
relevant informa ion to the oper tors afte a diagnosis process, incre sing the reliability of
this protective layer.
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4. Conclusions
A new layer of protection in industrial processes has been proposed. This new layer is
called a Super-Alarm, which refers to a new alert to the operators resulting from a diagnosis
procedure representing a superior alarm. Furthermore, a new methodology for the alarm
management of complex processes has been proposed, in order to generate Super-Alarms.
This methodology proposes a diagnosis process as a support tool to the operators during
transitional stages, based on situation recognition. The situations to recognize correspond
to the normal and/or abnormal process behaviors modeled by temporal patterns called
Chronicles. The case study illustrates the construction of a chronicle of an abnormal start-up
of an oil transport system, and then shows the way how a Super-Alarm is generated. Any
additional protection layer that increases the reliability of the industrial processes is well
received, because the risk of accidents and failures in which human lives are involved can
be reduced. Therefore, this proposal could increase the number of tools and components
that help the operators to detect early hazard situations, and the risk analysis methods
such as fault trees, bow ties, etc. can be used to construct models of failure scenarios in
a supervision system. The future work will be related to the implementation of this new
concept in the supervision tools of an industrial process (energy, chemical, mining), and
will use V-nets [29], guaranteeing the reliability of the diagnosis tool.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.W.V., G.P.-Z. and J.S.-M.; Methodology, A.O.; Validation,
J.W.V.; Formal Analysis, J.W.V.; Investigation, J.W.V.; Writing Original Draft Preparation, J.W.V. All
authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: Los autores reconocen el apoyo financiero del Proyecto CONCYTEC—Banco Mundial
Mejoramiento y Ampliación de los Servicios del Sistema Nacional de Ciencia Tecnología e Innovación Tec-
nológica 8682-PE, a través de su unidad ejecutora FONDECYT. Contrato número E041-01[N48-2018-
FONDECYT-BM-IADT-MU].
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study is available on request from the
corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Brennan, R. Toward Real-Time Distributed Intelligent Control: A Survey of Research Themes and Applications. IEEE Trans. Syst.
Man Cybern. 2007, 37, 744–765. [CrossRef]
2. Zhang, J.; Khalgui, M.; Li, Z.; Frey, G.; Mosbahi, O.; Ben Salah, H. Reconfigurable Coordination of Distributed Discrete Event
Control Systems. IEEE Trans. Control. Syst. Technol. 2014, 23, 323–330. [CrossRef]
3. Reifer, D.J. Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. IEEE Trans. Reliab. 1979, 28, 247–249. [CrossRef]
4. Morel, G.; Valckenaers, P.; Faure, J.-M.; Pereira, C.E.; Diedrich, C. Manufacturing Plant Control Challenges and Issues. Control.
Eng. Pract. 2007, 15, 1321–1331. [CrossRef]
5. Rodrigo, V.; Chioua, M.; Hagglund, T.; Hollender, M. Causal Analysis for Alarm Flood Reduction. IFAC-PapersOnLine 2016, 49,
723–728. [CrossRef]
6. Bodsberg, L.; Hokstad, P. Alarm and Shutdown Frequencies in Offshore Production. IFAC Proc. Vol. 1988, 21, 19–25. [CrossRef]
7. Agudelo, C.; Morant Anglada, F.; Quiles Cucarella, E.; Garca Moreno, E. Secuencias De Alarmas Para detección Y diagnóstico de
fallos. Rev. Colomb. Comput. 2011, 12, 31–44. (In Spanish) [CrossRef]
8. Izadi, I.; Shah, S.L.; Shook, D.S.; Chen, T. An Introduction to Alarm Analysis and Design. IFAC Proc. Vol. 2009, 42, 645–650.
[CrossRef]
9. Gómez, C.F.A. Integracion de Tecnicas y Las Secuencias de Alarmas Para la Deteccion y el Diagnostico de Fallos; Universitat Politecnica
de Valencia: Valencia, Spain, 2016. [CrossRef]
10. Vásquez Capacho, J.W. Chronicle Based Alarm Management. Available online: https://hal.laas.fr/Tel-02059631 (accessed on
1 October 2017).
11. Beebe, D.; Ferrer, S.; Logerot, D. The Connection of Peak Alarm Rates to Plant Incidents and What You Can Do to Minimize.
Process. Saf. Prog. 2012, 32, 72–77. [CrossRef]
Entropy 2021, 23, 139 15 of 15
12. Zhu, J.; Shu, Y.; Zhao, J.; Yang, F. A Dynamic Alarm Management Strategy for Chemical Process Transitions. J. Loss Prev. Process.
Ind. 2014, 30, 207–218. [CrossRef]
13. John, V.; Jorge, P.; Carlos, A.; Jose, J. Analysis of Alarm Management in Startups and Shutdowns for Oil Refining Processes. In
Proceedings of the 2013 II International Congress of Engineering Mechatronics and Automation (CIIMA), Bogotá, Colombia,
23–25 October 2013; pp. 1–6. [CrossRef]
14. Willey, R.J. Layer of Protection Analysis. Procedia Eng. 2014, 84, 12–22. [CrossRef]
15. Hokstad, P.; Corneliussen, K. Loss of Safety Assessment and the IEC 61508 Standard. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2004, 83, 111–120.
[CrossRef]
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